In the theory of the socialized actor (Parsons 1951), individual action is conceived as a choice between alternatives. Human action is understood in a utilitarian framework as instrumentally oriented and maximizing benefits. While a utilitarian attitude does not necessarily imply a view of human motivations as essentially selfish, it is the preferred interpretation of utilitarianism espoused by Talcott Parsons and much of contemporary sociology. In this context, it becomes crucial to explain by what mechanisms social order and stability are achieved in a society that would otherwise be in a permanent Hobbesian state of nature. In short, order and stability are essentially socially derived phenomena caused by a common value system – the “glue” of society. The common values of a society are embodied in norms that, if respected, guarantee the proper functioning and reproduction of the social system. In Parson`s framework, norms are exogenous: how such a common value system is created and how it can change are questions that remain unexplored. On the contrary, the most important question is how norms are followed and what makes rational egoists adhere to them. The answer to the socialized actor theory is that people willingly adhere to the common value system because it introjectively forms a constituent element of the personality itself (Parsons 1951). Not only will you not live your life the way you want to, but you will even let other people set the framework for how you should behave in society.

Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) designed an experiment to investigate the effects of two potentially applicable – but contradictory – behavioural principles, namely equality and reciprocity, on trust games. Note that the former can generally be defined as a rule that recommends minimizing payment differences, while the latter recommends taking a similar step to the others (regardless of payment considerations). The experimental design included two variants of trusted play: in the first, players started with the same equipment; In the second, the investor received double the money the trustee received. In both cases, the investor can transfer a predefined amount of money to the trustee or keep everything. After receiving the money, the trustee could in turn keep it or return part of it to the investor: under the same founding condition (“basic salary”), equality and reciprocity require the trustee to return part of the money to the investor; On the other hand, equality and reciprocity dictate different actions in the condition of unequal foundation (“asymmetry treatment”), since the trustee could only guarantee the equality of payment by a null retransfer. Xiao and Bicchieri elicited first- and second-order empirical beliefs in the subjects (“To what extent do you think other participants in your role will be transferred to their counterparts?”; What do you think you will do? “) and normative expectations (“To what extent do you think your counterpart thinks you should transfer to them? »). The experimental results show that a majority of trustees returned a positive amount if reciprocity reduced inequality in disbursements (in base salary); On the other hand, a majority of trustees did not reciprocate the transfer of investors if it would increase the inequality of payments (in the treatment of asymmetry). In addition, investors rightly believed that less money would be returned under asymmetry treatment than with a basic treatment, and most fiduciaries correctly assessed investors` beliefs in both treatments.

However, in dealing with asymmetry, empirical beliefs and normative expectations contradict each other: this emphasizes that when there is ambiguity about the present behavioral principle, each subject supports the rule of behavior that favors him the most. Thus, social norms can also help you stop a variety of bad habits, which can greatly improve your health level and overall quality of life. This is because compliance with social norms can lead to a high degree of dissatisfaction. Without the designated umpire, teams would then have to argue over how to interpret the rules. Instead, take a standard of collaboration. In this case, expecting almost everyone to comply may not be enough to incentivize compliance. If everyone is expected to cooperate, you may be tempted, if you are not monitored, to do the opposite. The fact is that, contrary to convention, adherence to social norms is almost never in the immediate interest of the individual. Often there is a discontinuity between the self-interest of the individual and the interests of the community that supports the social norm.

Now that we have seen the remarkable approaches to the emergence and stability of norms, we can move on to some general interpretive considerations about evolutionary models. An evolutionary approach is based on the principle that strategies with higher current payments are maintained, while strategies that lead to failure are abandoned. The success of a strategy is measured by its relative frequency in the population at a given point in time. This is easier to see in a game theory setting. A game is finally repeated often with randomly chosen opponents. After each round of the game, the actual winnings and strategies of the players become known to the public. Based on this information, each player adjusts their strategy for the next round. Payouts to an individual player depend on both their choice and the decisions of other players in the game, and players are rational in the sense that they maximize winnings. However, in an evolutionary model, players learn and adapt in a non-Bayesian way, that is, they do not condition past experiences with the Bayesian rule.